Marx’s Democratic Critique of Capitalism and Its Implications for China’s Developmental Trajectory.

In the 21st century, as the peoples of the world grow more closely tied together, the question of real transnational government will finally have to be faced. The end of the Cold War has not brought the peace, freedom from atrocities, and decline of tyranny for which we hoped. It is also clearer now that problems like economic risks, tax havens, and environmental degradation arising with global markets are far outstripping the governance capacities of our 20th century system of distinct (...) nation-states, even when they try to work together through intergovernmental agreements and organized bureaucracies of specialists. This work defends a cosmopolitan approach to global justice by arguing for new ways to combine the strengths of democratic nations in order to prevent mass atrocities and to secure other global public goods. While protecting cultural pluralism, Davenport argues that a Democratic League would provide a legal order capable of uniting the strength and inspiring moral vision of democratic nations to improve international security, stop mass atrocities, assist developing nations in overcoming corruption and poverty, and, in time, potentially address other global challenges in finance, environmental sustainability, stable food supplies, immigration, and so on. This work will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, international organizations, philosophy and global justice. (shrink)

As we all know, Marx's powerful and compelling critique of capitalism provided no explicit model for a viable alternative to capitalism, no "recipes for cookshops of the future," in his disdainful phrase.1 Marx shouldn’t be faulted for this omission. He was a "scientific" socialist. Although there were sufficient data available to him to ground his critique of capitalism, there was little upon which to draw regarding alternative economic institutions. No "experiments" had been performed. We no longer have that excuse.

We argue that, to effectively understand media effects in authoritarian societies, researchers must assess different types of media strategies adopted by authoritarian leaders. Using survey data from two Chinese cities, we examine the effects of two types of media strategies adopted by the Chinese government, targeting political attitudes and nonpolitical values and norms, respectively. Following a new line of research, we contrast China’s domestic-controlled media to foreign free media. After accounting for the selection bias in Chinese urbanites’ media access, (...) we do not find sufficient evidence for the effect of the media strategies directly targeting their democratic conceptions. However, sufficient and robust evidence shows that more intensive consumption of diverse media sources, including foreign media, does significantly but indirectly counteract the Chinese government’s political campaigns targeting its citizens’ democratic conceptions, via thwarting the government’s media strategies to cultivate a collectivistic norm in the society. (shrink)

Since Deng Xiaoping came into power, China has been described as pragmatic in its approach to politics and development, and in the nineties there has been a revival of interest in Chinese cultural tradition. What is the relation between these two phenomena? Do they coexist, separately in mutual indifference, or in tension? Has there been constructive engagement, or at the very least does the potential for such engagement exist? More specifically, what roles, if any, do they play in (...) class='Hi'>China's quest for democracy? Does Dewey's pragmatism have any relevance to China in the twenty-first century? The issue of cultural tradition was central in the historical encounter between Dewey's pragmatism and Confucianism in the New Culture movement of early twentieth century. It is still salient in the debates about China's future and whether it would or should follow the democratic path. This essay will examine anti-democratic tendencies in the rising cultural nationalism in China and, through a philosophical exploration of John Dewey's views about tradition, it will suggest how Chinese pragmatists today might defend democracy against attacks by cultural nationalists who reject the democratic path as alien and therefore wrong for China. (shrink)

Comrades, the fact that a special report on the activity of the Young Communist International is on the agenda of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern shows that the Congress pays the greatest attention to the youth movement. Nevertheless, the fact must not be passed over in silence that the Communist Parties devote insufficient direction and support to the work of the, youth organizations.

But what is the message of China's rise as an economic and political power? Tongdong Bai addresses this pressing question by examining the history of political theories and practices from China's past, and showing how it impacts upon the present. Chinese political traditions are often viewed as "authoritarian" (in contrast with "Western" democratic traditions), but the historical reality is much more complex and there is a need to understand the political values shaping China. Bai argues that (...) the debates between China's two main political theories - Confucianism and Legalism - anticipate themes in modern political thought and offer resources for thinking about contemporary political problems. This groundbreaking work offers a insight into the political history and thought of a nation. (shrink)

What sort of economy and state is China? Is it capitalist or socialist? The answer to those questions must start with Marx’s law of value, which defines the nature of mode of production and social relations under capitalism. It continues with an understanding of the concept of a transitional economy between capitalism and socialism. We can define several criteria for an economy in transition to socialism. Based on those criteria, China is not a capitalist economy; its phenomenal economic (...) success is product of a predominantly state-owned and directed economy clearly distinct from capitalist economies, whether democratic or autocratic. However, it is still far away from achieving socialism or communism. It is an economy in a “trapped transition”. It is trapped because it lacks any meaningful forms of workers’ democracy and it is surrounded by the forces of imperialism which seek to strangle it. Indeed, any transition to socialism requires international coordination and unity to develop the productive forces and sustain workers’ control. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we utilize a rhetorically grounded textual analysis to study the Open Letter, the first publicized text sent out from the Central government to all the Party and Communist Youth League members on 25 September 1980. By reading through the text, we identify three individual figures – the ‘people’ as ‘the origin of problems,’ the people as ‘reasonable and considerate,’ and those charged with advocating compliance as ‘active propagandists and responsible educators’ – that have been crafted in (...) the text. We argue that by constructing three subject positions that served to identify the people via both language and social practices, the Central government in China after Mao Zedong’s death constructed the discourses of urgency and necessity of adhering to the one-child policy to both convince and compel people to exercise responsibility in having only one child. (shrink)

Are there any coherent and defensible alternatives to liberal democracy? The author examines the possibility that a reformed democratic centralism-the principle around which China's current polity is officially organized-might be legitimate, according to both an inside and an outside perspective. The inside perspective builds on contemporary Chinese political theory; the outside perspective critically deploys Rawls's notion ofa "decent society " as its standard. Along the way, the author pays particular attention to the kinds and degree of pluralism a (...) decent society can countenance, and to the specific institutions in China that might enable the realization of a genuine and/or decent democratic centralism. The author argues that by considering both inside and outside perspectives, and the degrees to which they inter-penetrate and critically inform one another, we can engage in a global philosophy that neither pre-judges alternative political traditions nor falls prey to false conceptual barriers. (shrink)

Cosmopolitan justice calls for extensive institutional transformations at the international level. But in the absence of a global enforcing authority, such transformations are bound to be hampered by a range of obstacles, including non-compliance and coordination problems. What solutions can a cosmopolitan thinker offer to address these challenges? In answering this question, the paper focuses on the role that international cooperation between the world?s democracies can play in promoting cosmopolitan aspirations. It argues that such cooperation has a crucial role to (...) play in executing global justice reforms; and furthermore, that the world?s democracies have a moral duty to lead the way in implementing cosmopolitan justice. The paper then suggests that a ?League of Democracies? ? an intergovernmental organization which is open exclusively to the world?s democracies ? could potentially facilitate the type of democratic cooperation that is necessary for cosmopolitan justice. (shrink)

One of the most striking features of the South African polity, as the 20th anniversary of democratization draws closer, is the intensity of public arguments about race that show no signs of abating any time soon. In the midst of worsening socio-economic inequality, it’s the economic question – of the terms of access to wealth, status and economic power, and of how to erase the residues of apartheid’s economic dispossession – that dominates these arguments. In recent years, the ANC Youth (...) League – a renewal of the Youth League originally created in 1944 and then banned in 1960 – effectively positioned itself at the forefront of this politicization of race. I argue in this essay that from 1994 to early 2012, the contemporary Youth League retained its predecessor’s political persona of precocious provocateur, particularly on matters of race – but differently styled, and deployed to different political ends in the new conjuncture. The repertoire of the Youth League during this period was shaped by a clientelist politics, informed by a version of freedom as a freedom to consume, and the concomitant spectacles of conspicuous consumption that infused the iconography of the ‘new’ South Africa. These tendencies were most dramatically illustrated during Julius Malema’s controversial tenure as Youth League president. Largely disconnected from discursive, deliberative notions of the political, the Youth League’s version of politics became an amalgamation of angry street protest, patronage, and lavish partying, which produced a racialized iconography of being well-heeled and down-trodden in a seamless narrative of black solidarity. (shrink)

As short a time ago as 1992, political scientist Francis Fukuyama was optimistically (and wrongly, as it turned out) predicting “the end of history”, a stable future where liberal democracies would be the norm throughout the world, leading to lasting peace and economic prosperity. A few years later we have Eric Li, who equally gingerly predicts (for example in the pages of Foreign Affairs magazine) a “post-democratic” future, beginning with the success of China. Oh boy.

In contemporary scholarship on Chinese ideological debates, both pro-system Chinese intellectuals and Western-based academics present China’s future as a binary choice between a “China Model” of authoritarian statism and a “Western” vision of democratic liberalism. This article deconstructs this dichotomy by proposing a new heuristic for conceptualizing ideological cleavage. Informed by interviews with twenty-eight leading Chinese intellectuals, the case is made for a two-dimensional spectrum allowing for ideological co-variation, on one axis, between two contending socioeconomic roads of (...) national revival, capitalism and socialism, and on the other axis between paternalism and fraternalism as conflicting ideals for the political system. This model not only resonates with Chinese intellectual history, but also allows us to uncover two crucial ideological tendencies that disappear with the China Model/western Path dichotomy: (i) the emerging hybrid of Confucian politics and free market economics, and (ii) the tabooed fraternalist-socialist legacy of the 1989 movement. (shrink)

From the "Red Menace" to Tiananmen Square, the United States and China have long had an emotionally tumultuous relationship. Richard Madsen's frank and innovative examination of the moral history of U.S.-China relations targets the forces that have shaped this surprisingly strong tie between two strikingly different nations. Combining his expertise as a sinologist with the vision of America developed in _Habits of the Heart_ and _The Good Society_, Madsen studies the cultural myths that have shaped the perceptions of (...) people of both nations for the past twenty-five years. The dominant American myth about China, born in the 1960s, foresaw Western ideals of economic, intellectual, and political freedom emerging triumphant throughout the world. Nixon's visit to China nurtured this idea, and by the 1980s it was helping to sustain America's hopefulness about its own democratic identity. Meanwhile, Chinese popular culture has focused on the U.S., especially American consumer goods—Coca-Cola was described by the _People's Daily_ as "capitalism concentrated in a bottle." Today we face a new global institutional and cultural environment in which the old myths no longer work for either Americans or Chinese. Madsen provides a framework for us to think about the relationship between democratic ideals and economic/political realities in the post-Cold War world. What he proposes is no less than the foundation for building a public philosophy for the emerging world order. (shrink)

Why was it not until the mid-1980s that the intellectuals, the "democratic elite" of China, initiated a public dialogue about "inalienable" rights in the Western sense? The reason may lie in the impact of events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Samuel P. Huntington asserts that the world is now entering an age of “the clash of civilizations.” Specifically, the clash is between democratic Western civilization and undemocratic civilizations in the rest of the world, Confucian and Islamic civilizations in particular. Huntington also suggests that in order for democracy to take roots in a Confucian society, undemocratic elements in Confucianism must be superseded by democratic elements. The purpose of this essay is to examine the future relationship between democracy and (...) Confucianism in the part of the world where they are most likely to clash, namely, China. (shrink)

This chapter explores the relevance of Dewey’s philosophy of democracy for China within the context of Dewey’s historical visit to China and continuing debates about his influence among the Chinese. Dewey’s pragmatism illuminates certain problems in the contemporary discourses about China’s democratization, including questions whether Chinese culture is an obstacle to democratization and the strengths of a Deweyan approach to articulating a Confucian democracy that could work in China. Dewey’s emphasis on experimentation in social reforms and (...) his fallibilism regarding the political institutions of democracy open up new possibilities for China’s democratization and suggest where one might look to discover the indigenous conditions—the varied experiments being conducted in local governance and civil society—from which a Chinese democracy might be born. (shrink)

This article investigates the specific cultural and collaborative nature of China’s public spaces and how they are formed through performative appropriations. Collective cultural practices as political participation were encouraged during the Mao era when cultural activities played a key role in workers’ education and participation. Since the opening-up period, performance in public space has become widespread in China and creates alternative community spaces that constitute alternatives to capitalist spaces of consumption. Using Habermas’s theory of communicative action, we argue (...) that cultural practices performed in public space create a proletariat public sphere that plays a wider role in governance and China’s democratization. Further, the article examines performative practices in public space. It traces the popular activity of public square dancing through history and counters this research with a parallel study of a much younger skateboarding practice. The two practices are very differently rooted. Yet both practices appear to move through cycles of disruption and appropriation, followed by an affirmation of governmental rule. The studies reveal that western ideas of citizenship and individual leisure are less applicable. Public spaces are largely managed through collaborative practices, whereas contemporary scholarship reaffirms Fei Xiaotong’s description of Chinese society as individuals positioned within a complex network of concentric circles. (shrink)

ExcerptAmerica’s prestige as the bearer of a liberal democratic world order has taken a dent due to both geopolitical power shifts and the debilitating polarization of American democratic culture. Relatedly, symbolic power has been shifting away from liberal ideals and standards of legitimacy globally.1 It has become ever harder to deny that a variety of non-Western civilizational states, China chief among them, will not conform, nor even try to conform, to the West’s liberal democratic standards. Though (...) these states imported all kinds of Western-style institutions in their earlier phases of modernization, they now seem ever more determined to break free from the West’s gravitational pull. (shrink)

The essay begins from Alan Gewirth's influential account of human rights, and specifically with his argument that the human right to political participation can only be fulfilled by competitive, liberal democracy. I show that his argument rests on empirical, rather than conceptual grounds, which opens the possibility that in China, alternative forms of participation may be legitimate or even superior. An examination of the theory and contemporary practice of 'democratic centralism' shows that while it does not now adequately (...) support the right to political participation, a reformed version could. I focus in particular on the roles that could be played by consultative institutions, looking both to recent Chinese proposals and to analogues currently existing in Japan. I conclude that a reformed democratic centralism may well be the objective toward which Chinese people should strive. (shrink)

For decades, scholars and politicians have vigorously debated whether Confucianism is compatible with democracy, yet little is known about how it affects the process of democratization in East Asia. In this book, Doh Chull Shin examines the prevalence of core Confucian legacies and their impacts on civic and political orientations in six Confucian countries: China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Analyses of the Asian Barometer and World Values surveys reveal that popular attachment to Confucian legacies has mixed (...) results on democratic demand. While Confucian political legacies encourage demand for a non-liberal democratic government that prioritizes the economic welfare of the community over the freedom of individual citizens, its social legacies promote interpersonal trust and tolerance, which are critical components of democratic civic life. Thus, the author argues that citizens of historically Confucian Asia have an opportunity to combine the best of Confucian ideals and democratic principles in a novel, particularly East Asian brand of democracy. (shrink)

During the reign of China’s Communist Party leader, Mao Zedong (1949–1976), any political or academic dissent was brutally suppressed. With Mao’s death in 1976, China, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and his successors, opened China to the outside world and loosened political controls over the intellectual community. As China moved to a market economy and engagement with the Western world, the party loosened controls over intellectual endeavors. Nevertheless, a small number of intellectuals who criticized party’ (...) policies and publicly called for democratic reforms were silenced and a a number of them were imprisoned. Though, intellectuals enjoyed more personal and academic freedom in the post-Mao era, if they criticized the party’s policies or practices directly, they were ostracized from the intellectual community and a small number were imprisoned. (shrink)

In this book, Julia Ching offers a survey of over 4,000 years of Chinese civilization through an examination of the relationship between kingship and mysticism. She investigates the sage-king myth and ideal, arguing that institutions of kingship were bound up with cultivation of trance states and communication with spirits. Over time, the sage-king myth became a model for the actual ruler. As a paradigm, it was also appropriated by private individuals who strove for wisdom without becoming kings. As the Confucian (...) tradition interacted with the Taoist and the Buddhist, the religious character of spiritual and mystical cultivation became more pronounced. But the sage-king idea continued, promoting expectations of benevolent despotism rather than democratization in Chinese civilization. (shrink)

The essay begins from Alan Gewirth's influential account of human rights, and specifically with his argument that the human right to political participation can only be fulfilled by competitive, liberal democracy. I show that his argument rests on empirical, rather than conceptual grounds, which opens the possibility that in China, alternative forms of participation may be legitimate or even superior. An examination of the theory and contemporary practice of ‘democratic centralism’ shows that while it does not now adequately (...) support the right to political participation, a reformed version could. I focus in particular on the roles that could be played by consultative institutions, looking both to recent Chinese proposals and to analogues currently existing in Japan. I conclude that a reformed democratic centralism may well be the objective toward which Chinese people should strive. (shrink)

The surprising story of how Greek classics are being pressed into use in contemporary China to support the regime’s political agenda As improbable as it may sound, an illuminating way to understand today’s China and how it views the West is to look at the astonishing ways Chinese intellectuals are interpreting—or is it misinterpreting?—the Greek classics. In Plato Goes to China, Shadi Bartsch offers a provocative look at Chinese politics and ideology by exploring Chinese readings of Plato, (...) Aristotle, Thucydides, and other ancient writers. She shows how Chinese thinkers have dramatically recast the Greek classics to support China’s political agenda, diagnose the ills of the West, and assert the superiority of China’s own Confucian classical tradition. In a lively account that ranges from the Jesuits to Xi Jinping, Bartsch traces how the fortunes of the Greek classics have changed in China since the seventeenth century. Before the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Chinese typically read Greek philosophy and political theory in order to promote democratic reform or discover the secrets of the success of Western democracy and science. No longer. Today, many Chinese intellectuals use these texts to critique concepts such as democracy, citizenship, and rationality. Plato’s “Noble Lie,” in which citizens are kept in their castes through deception, is lauded; Aristotle’s Politics is seen as civic brainwashing; and Thucydides’s criticism of Athenian democracy is applied to modern America. What do antiquity’s “dead white men” have left to teach? By uncovering the unusual ways Chinese thinkers are answering that question, Plato Goes to China opens a surprising new window on China today. (shrink)

This essay critically revisits Jiwei Ci’s prudential argument for political democracy in China from the very Tocquevillian standpoint on which Ci’s core theoretical argument is predicated. I argue that Ci’s underlying assumption and argument regarding the enabling conditions of democracy actually depart significantly from Tocqueville’s own view due to Ci’s overly positive understanding of equality of conditions as directly constitutive of a democratic society and his assumed causal connection between capitalist society and political democracy. After clarifying what Tocqueville (...) meant by equality of conditions and discussing his prudential remedy for the perils of democracy, I conclude by suggesting an alternative pragmatic and prudential justification for democracy in China that is more consistent with the Tocquevillian conception of democracy. (shrink)

Joseph Chan and Sungmoon Kim take me to task for my understanding and uses of Tocqueville, and because of the resemblance they claim to see between one of my major arguments and modernization theory. I think their charges are mistaken or misplaced. Chan and Kim reject my claims that China is already, in a meaningful sense and to a substantial degree, a democratic society, and that, unless such a society is matched by political democratization, a major legitimation crisis (...) is almost inevitable in the foreseeable future. I try to show that they are wrong in their assessment of the state of Chinese society and in their dismissal of the crisis tendencies that only timely democratization can help avert. Chan and Kim completely misconstrue what my prudential argument for democracy in China means, and what it does not, and I explain why. Finally, I reaffirm, over Chan’s objections, the view that the fundamental choice regarding political legitimacy in China today lies between the Mandate of Heaven and democracy, given the demise of communism, and I restate this view in terms of the concept of sovereignty. (shrink)

Democratic elections, whatever the flaws, tend to produce a sense of social cohesion as ordinary citizens, treated as equals, gather together to select their country’s political leaders. In China,...

China now faces a national identity problem, that is, sections of the national population do not identify with the Chinese nation-state in which they live. Tibetans, for example, endeavor to create their own political identity through the reconstruction of a Tibetan cultural and ethnic identity. China's national identity problem also involves the question of reunification with Taiwan. In Taiwan, both the Guomindang and the Democratic Progressive Party governments have refused to reunify with China. The question of (...) Taiwan and Tibet are different cases and require different treatment,1 but Beijing's response to the two questions—refusing to adopt a democratic approach—is the same. (shrink)

Let me first express my gratitude for the three detailed and informative critiques of my book The China Model. These critiques are themselves models of Confucian civility, even as they express sharp areas of disagreement. There does seem to be agreement that the ideal of a Confucian-inspired democratic meritocracy is a worthwhile political project, particularly in the Chinese political context, but Huang, Li, and Wang question my book's arguments in defense of this ideal. There are three kinds of (...) critiques: the need to take Confucianism more seriously, the need to take democracy more seriously, and the need to take political meritocracy more seriously. Let me try to respond to each critique in turn.Yong... (shrink)

During the resistance war against Japan in China, the national administrative authority penetrated the rural society in Enshi city in Hubei province. For one thing, the village officials as the national administrative power strengthened their functions controlling the rural area; for another, the clan organizations in the rural area in Enshi combated the control. The result of confrontation between the two forces was to further strengthen the legitimacy of the system, extend the national executive power down to the grassroots (...) level, instead of the legitimacy of cultural traditions, and control the rural communities in the Enshi area. This control shows that a modern local administrative system has been established in the Enshi area, and to a certain extent, it reflects that the national government was trying to combine the national strong power with the democratic system to explore patterns of modern political initiatives. The result was that this powerful control in this particular setting of the war again Japan set an unprecedented performance. (shrink)

This is the first book-length study of the development of civility in Chinese societies. Although some social scientists and political philosophers have discussed civility, none has defined it as an analytical tool to systematically measure attitudes and behavior, and few have applied it to a non-Western society. By comparing the development of civility in mainland China and Taiwan, Civility and Its Development: The Experiences of China and Taiwan analyzes the social conditions needed for civility to become established in (...) a society. Schak argues that the attempts to impose civility top-down from the state are ineffective. Civility appeared in Taiwan only after state efforts to impose it ceased at the end of the 1980s when Taiwan began to democratize, and the PRC government civility campaigns have so far had only limited success. The book concludes with an examination of various differences between Taiwan and the PRC relevant to Taiwan’s having become a society with civility while the PRC still encounters difficulties in doing so. The essential factor in developing civility in Taiwan, Schak contends, was its evolution from a place composed of myriad small, inward-looking communities to a society in which everyone shares a strong identity and civic consciousness, and people consider others as fellow members, not anonymous strangers. “This book represents the most thorough review of what social scientists once called ‘the civilizing process’ in Chinese society. David C. Schak builds on the earlier studies on this issue and goes well beyond the established literature.” —James Watson, Fairbank Professor of Chinese Society and Professor of Anthropology, Emeritus, Harvard University “This is a topic that people talk about all the time, and David C. Schak draws a lot of material together in a systematic and comprehensive way that can stimulate important discussions beyond the academy.” —Thomas Gold, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley. (shrink)

Wei-Bin Zhang offers an authoritative guide to the philosophy of Confucian regions, covering mainland China Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, and Singapore. All, except Singapore, employed Confucianism as the state ideology before the West came to East Asia. The differences and similarities between the variety of Confucian schools are examined. The author concludes that the philosophical and ethical principles of Confucianism will assist in the industrialization and democratization of the region.

The welfare state, once seen as the best institutional response to people in need, has steadily come under pressure, as much from shrinking state capacities as from neo-liberal advocates of individual responsibility. Still, despite decline of the post-war consensus on the efficacy of the welfare state, social ‘vulnerability’ still remains the key focus of public policy. However, though much in use in contemporary political discourse, the logical and practical implications of social vulnerability remain unclear. Its essential subjectivity – it is (...) the ‘feeling of vulnerability’ which makes one vulnerable – turns the concept into a catch-all variable, impeding rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis. I respond to this problem with a ‘vulnerability-responsibility’, model. Its parameters include a ‘responsive’ state, an active civil society and a participatory political environment, bolstered by the assertion of agency of the vulnerable. With India as an empirical exemplar, the essay shows how ‘nested’ vulnerability – a community of pro-active citizens in need of urgent and vital assistance - in the backdrop of a responsive state and competitive, robust and resilient political participation, can generate a sustainable, context-relevant process to cope with the problem of social vulnerability. The model, currently aimed at vulnerable citizens in a democratic state, has the potential of being extended to non-democracies as well as vulnerable non-citizens into its domain. (shrink)

School moral education in any country is carried out in a particular social and cultural context. The renewal of policy and practice in moral education in China has come about because of a rapidly changing Chinese society, as a result of the government's ‘reform and opening up’ policy since the end of the 1970s. The consequent changes in the Chinese economy, politics and culture are innovatory and challenging. It is these changes that have brought about, and will continue to (...) bring about, new ideas and practices in moral education. This paper describes how Chinese moral education has been influenced according to recent social changes and modernization in China, including the formation of the market economy, the impact of globalization, mass media and the Internet, cultural diversity and value pluralism, trends to democratization in politics, and structural changes in the family. It also considers the kind of social issues and challenges which are being dealt with and anticipated in policy, theory and practice in contemporary Chinese moral education. (shrink)

EDITOR’S ABSTRACTIn this article, Huang discusses the process whereby the concept of democracy was translated into the Chinese context during the transitional period of modern China. He asserts that while democracy was rooted in a pessimistic conception of human nature and epistemology in the West, Chinese intellectuals rather tended toward an optimistic view of both, a fact that brought them closer to the Rousseauian tradition of democratic thought. However, Huang also sees signs of a Millianism with Chinese characteristics (...) in the thought of Yan Fu and Liang Qichao. (shrink)

Jiwei Ci's Moral China in the Age of Reform is a landmark in our attempt to understand, diagnose, and provide solutions to the moral crisis in post-Mao China. It is difficult not to be deeply impressed by the perceptive observations, provocative claims, and sophisticated arguments Ci presents in this book. In my brief comment, I shall think with Ci on the relationship between the democratic and liberal components of a liberal democratic society on the one hand (...) and that between the right and the good on the other.Ci makes the claim that in the very idea of liberal democracy the liberal component has priority over the democratic component. What he means by this is that "members of a modern society … pursue... (shrink)